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From the mid-nineteenth century until recently, Italian economists’ 
work has been characterized by a close interaction between theoretical 
thinking and an insightful analysis of the most complex issues facing the 
economy and society and requiring adequate policy decisions. Thanks to a 
path breaking research, coordinated recently by M.M. Augello and M.E.L. 
Guidi, we know now quite a lot about the multifaceted work as legislators 
done by the economists in the Italian Parliament during the ‘liberal age’ 
(1861-1922)1. No overall analysis, however, was available of the same 
activity in the following years, in particular during the interwar period.   
This paper, whose methodological approach draws on the above 
mentioned research, aims to analyse the role played by the Italian 
economists as members of the government and of the Parliament (the 
Chamber of deputies and the Senate) during the fascist regime. To this end, 
section one analyses the deep institutional changes that took place during 
this period, focusing in particular on the radical change in the balance of 
power between the executive and the legislative; section two provides an 
overview of the economists who played a significant role as legislators and 
policymakers under fascism; section three examines the work of the 
economists who became members of the government as ministers or 
undersecretaries (Alberto De’ Stefani, Giacomo Acerbo, Arrigo Serpieri and 
Giuseppe Tassinari); the following sections analyse the legislative work of 
the economists who were, respectively, members of the Chamber of 
deputies and of the Senate. 
 
 
1. The institutional framework: the changing role of Parliament and of 
government  during fascism.  
 
Recent literature (Melis, 2018; Soddu, 2008; Gentile, 2002; Fimiani, 
2001) has highlighted the fact that during fascism there was a profound 
change in the functions exercised by the Parliament and the executive and 
                                                          
1 Augello and Guidi, 2002; 2003. For a comparative analysis of the role of the economists 
in Parliament in several European countries in the years 1848-1920 cf. Augello and Guidi, 
2005. 
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indeed in the very nature of these institutions. From its very beginning, 
fascism rejected the principle of the “sovereignty of the people” as expressed 
through a freely elected, pluralistic Parliament and acted to shift the balance 
of power in favour of a government led by a charismatic duce2. The degree of 
representativeness of the Chamber of deputies was then progressively 
reduced (the other Chamber, the Senate, was not elective: its members were 
appointed by the king and kept their office for life). 
The process that led to the emptying of the functions of the elective 
chamber, however, was anything but linear: only in 1939, after many studies 
and analyses made by committees appointed by the regime, the Chamber of 
deputies was formally repealed and replaced by the “Chamber of Fasces and 
Corporations”.  
A first step in this direction was the Acerbo law3, approved in 
November 1923. This law attributed two thirds of the seats (356 on 535) to 
the list that had obtained the highest number of votes. The quorum was set 
at 25%. As a consequence of this mechanism and of the climate of violence 
and intimidation established by the extreme right, the elections of April 
1924 secured a large majority for the fascist and nationalist side. In 
November 1926 then, the residual voices of dissent were silenced by a 
measure that declared the deputies of the opposition no longer in office. 
The final blow to the Chamber’s representative functions was given by 
a new electoral law passed in May 1928 and further amended in January 
1929. The new law, drawn up by Alfredo Rocco, at that time minister of 
justice and a leading figure of the nationalist movement, established a single 
national constituency and a single list, that included all the candidates (400 
in total). The task of drawing up this list was attributed to the ‘Grand Council 
of fascism’, the highest constitutional body of the regime, on the basis of one 
thousand candidates chosen by the union confederations, various national 
associations, universities and academies (Salvemini, 1937; De Felice, 1968, 
324-5). 
This law, applied during the 1929 elections, transformed the elections 
into a plebiscite: voters were called upon to approve in full (or, in theory, to 
reject) the list elaborated by the regime. Indeed the appeal to voters, 
underlined Alfredo Rocco, did not take place in the name of an hypothetical 
“popular sovereignty” but to “test their state of mind, to improve the contact 
between the State and the masses” (quoted in Fimiani, 2001, 106). In other 
                                                          
2 The main objectives of Fascism from a constitutional point of view were, observes 
Fimiani, 2001, "the destruction of the pluralistic parliamentary system in its various 
articulations" and the establishment of the "absolute supremacy of the executive" (p. 95). 
On this point, it should be remembered that anti-parliamentarism was a widespread 
attitude in the nationalist literature since the beginning of the 20th century. 
3 Giacomo Acerbo was at the time undersecretary to the presidency of the council of 
ministries and therefore a key advisor to Mussolini. Cf. infra, note 17. 
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words, the regime did not at all consider itself bound to achieve popular 
legitimacy. 
At the same time, the legislative function of the lower Chamber was 
substantially reduced: in the XXIX legislature (1934-39), for example, the 
vast majority of the bills passed were of government initiative (Melis, 2018, 
307). The debate on the floor, in accordance with the anti-parliamentary 
rhetoric of the regime, was also compressed: particularly in the second half 
of the 1930s, several measures were approved without discussion. 
Finally, as mentioned, in 1939 the Chamber of Deputies was replaced 
by a ‘Chamber of Fasces and Corporations’. In this body the legislative 
function was exercised entirely inside the various committees: the draft 
laws were examined and, in general, approved without discussion and then 
transmitted to Mussolini and to the king for the final seal. 
The evolution of the Senate is partly different: the senators were 
appointed by royal decree, maintained their function for life and came 
largely from the pre-fascist political élite, from the top of the judiciary and 
the army, or from academia. During the 1930s, however, also this Chamber 
was progressively "fascistized" (an active role was played by the ‘Fascist 
National Union of the Senate’: cf. Gentile, 2002; Gentile and Campochiaro, 
2003); from 1939, moreover, membership to the PNF became compulsory 
for newly appointed senators4. The dissent could be manifested through 
abstaining from taking part to the discussion on the floor (this was the 
position adopted by Luigi Einaudi).  
Having said that, it appears reductive to see the Parliament under 
fascism as simple rubber stamp for the initiatives of the government (cf. 
Soddu, 2008; Melis, 2018). The Parliament was rather a "consultative body": 
deputies and senators cooperated to varying degrees in the final drafting of 
legislative measures with amendments, suggestions and recommendations.  
Furthermore, it must be added that in several circumstances the 
debate in both Chambers reflected the views of different and sometimes 
conflicting interest groups inside the fascist regime (e.g. the landowners, the 
industrialists, the representatives of the fascist trade unions and of the 
professional associations). This happened in particular during the 
discussion of the annual budgets of the various ministries, which by law 
were submitted to the analysis of parliamentary committees and had then to 
be approved in the general assembly of both Chambers. In some cases, this 
offered the opportunity of real debate and even of criticism, albeit usually 
expressed with caution and masked by facade praise5. This point was 
                                                          
4 This obligation did not apply to the incumbent senators: Achille Loria and Luigi Einaudi, 
for example, never joined the fascist party. 
5 In several cases the ministries recognized openly that the topics raised during the debate 
were indeed relevant and promised to take note of them. Particularly in Senate the 
discussion became sometimes frank and direct. See in this regard a lively exchange of 
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underlined also by an authoritative journal such as The Economist in a few 
correspondences from Italy, attributed to Luigi Einaudi6. 
The role of the government also changed substantially: not 
surprisingly a clear centrality was assumed by the head of government 
(Mussolini). For many years the duce held also ad interim several key 
ministries, while the remaining ministries were entrusted mainly to experts 
in the respective fields, called to prepare legislative measures aimed at 
implementing key policy decisions inspired by the head of government. 
 
 
2. The role of the Italian economists as policymakers and legislators: an 
overview  
 
In this context, the Italian economists played a crucial role as builders 
of the ‘new’ fascist State but also, in a few cases, as bearers of critical views, 
to the extent that these could be still expressed7. Taking into consideration 
the period 1924-1943 (which includes four legislatures) several scholars of 
economics and statistics with academic status became members of the 
government or of Parliament: four of them (Alberto De’ Stefani; Giacomo 
Acerbo; Arrigo Serpieri; Giuseppe Tassinari) played a key role in the 
government and, at the same time, were members of the Chamber of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
views between the Senator Ugo Ancona and the Minister of Finance, Paolo Thaon di Revel 
during the discussion of the budget of the same ministry, in May 1935. Ancona: “The 
official total of public debts amounts to 105 billion. Now, in reality, the overall figure is 
much higher”; Thaon: “It is not true Senator Ancona. I have provided precise data to the 
Chamber”; Ancona. “Pardon, Honourable Minister. I have this habit, good or bad, of 
scrutinizing the relevant documents. Now if we sum up all the debts of the State, we reach 
at least 160 billion”; Thaon: “This is the estimate made by Salvemini abroad”; Ancona: “No, 
Minister, this is the bill made by the Financial Times, which reaches 160 billion and I 
believe that the figure is correct”; Thaon: “I rule out that the Financial Times can be better 
informed than the Italian Minister of Finance” (A.P. Senate, 28th May 1935, 1327). Gaetano 
Salvemini (1873−1957), former professor of history at the University of Florence, was a 
leading antifascist in exile, very critical of Mussolini’s regime. Cf. Salvemini, 1936. 
6 Cf. this passage, drawn from an article attributed to Einaudi, published on The Economist, 
13th July, 1929, p. 70: “Budgets for the financial year from July 1, 1929, to June 30, 1930, 
have been unanimously approved by the Corporative Chamber of Deputies and by an 
overwhelming majority of the Senate. Notwithstanding, Parliament has not spared 
criticism of increases of expenditure and methods of accounting. The reports by deputy 
Mazzini to the Chamber and by senator Mayer to the Senate, on behalf of their respective 
Budget committees, are very interesting and it cannot be said that the two committees are 
less outspoken in their criticism than in the pre-war years” (Rpt. in Marchionatti, 2000, 
475-6). 
7 For recent, insightful analyses of the main distinguishing features of the Italian economic 
thought in the interwar period, cf. Faucci, 2015; Barucci-Misiani-Mosca, 2017. 
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deputies8. Nine were members of the Chamber of deputies only: three of 
them (Antonio Graziadei; Arturo Labriola; Angelo Mauri) were anti-fascist 
and as such were stripped of office, as mentioned, in 1926; the remaining 
scholars (Agostino Lanzillo; Gaetano Zingali; Gino Arias; Vincenzo Ricchioni; 
Attilio Da Empoli and Zeno Vignati) were instead to various degree 
supporters of the regime.  
During the same period, four authoritative economists were members 
of the Senate: Achille Loria; Luigi Einaudi; Pietro Sitta; Federico Flora. 
Despite the diversity of their scientific and professional biography, it 
appears significant that several of the above mentioned authors and 
policymakers were applied economists. In particular, it is worth to underline 
the presence of a substantial group of agricultural economists (six in total, 
three of whom participated in government activities). This appears to 
confirm the centrality of agriculture for the regime both at an economic and 
social level (more than half of labour force was employed in agriculture). 
The presence of ideologists and/or theorists of corporatism is significant 
but, nevertheless, circumscribed. 
 
 
3. Building the behemoth: the economists at the government  
 
Analyzing the activity of the economists at the government during the 
fascist period, it is difficult to overestimate the role played by Alberto De’ 
Stefani, minister of finance from November 1922 (and of treasury from 
December of the same year) till June 1925 9. 
During his formative years De’ Stefani was strongly influenced by 
Fedele Lampertico − an author whose methodological stance resembles that 
of the “German historical school” − but also by the leading representatives of 
economic liberalism such as Francesco Ferrara, Vilfredo Pareto and Maffeo 
Pantaleoni. From the very beginning, then, he was an eclectic thinker, who 
singled out as a key challenge facing the Italian economy the need to 
increase its productiveness: this had to be achieved through a valorization of 
the national resources and skills, the cooperation between workers and 
entrepreneurs and a more efficient and lean public administration.  
                                                          
8
 Arrigo Serpieri, after being part of this Chamber from 1924 till 1939, on that year was 
appointed member of the Senate. 
9 De’ Stefani (Verona, 1879−Roma, 1969) taught political economy at the Universities of 
Ferrara, Padua and Venice. On October 1925 he became dean of the newly founded Faculty 
of political science at the University of Rome. His writings include several essays on 
monetary theory, history of thought and demography. From 1926 till the end of the 
Thirties he was also the leading commentator on economic and financial matters for the 
Corriere della Sera, one of the most influential newspapers in Italy. Cf. Marcoaldi, 1986; 
1991.  
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After fighting as a voluntary during World War I, De’ Stefani adhered to 
the fascist party and played an active role in the squads actions again the 
socialists. Elected in Parliament in 1921, he emerged in the early ‘20s as the 
most authoritative economist inside the fascist movement. In his writings 
and public discourses, he stressed the need to defend private initiative and 
middle class savings against excess taxation and inflation. Public 
expenditures should be severely checked; the government, however, should 
play a robust role in coordinating and promoting growth. 
In 1922, on the eve of the “march to Rome”, De’ Stefani’s views 
perfectly fitted Mussolinis’s plans to appeal to the Italian conservative public 
opinion and the leading businessmen, by accreditating himself as a 
moderate leader, who favoured fiscal and monetary orthodoxy. Not 
surprisingly, when at the end of October Mussolini was asked by the king to 
form a new government, he selected the young De’ Stefani as his Minister of 
finance. 
Once in government, De’ Stefani presented at the Chamber of deputies, 
on 25th November 192210, an ambitious programme aimed primarily at 
balancing the budget by eliminating the huge amount of deficit inherited 
from the war period and promoting investment and capital accumulation in 
the private sector (cf. Guarneri, 1953; Clough, 1964; Zamagni, 1991). 
The first task was achieved by de’ Stefani through substantial spending 
cuts (through a reduction of military expenditures and the dismissal of 
public sector’s employees) and an increase in tax revenues, achieved 
primarily through a widening of the tax base − by including categories 
previously exempted such as skilled workers − and a reduction of tax 
evasion. In 1925 a progressive income tax was introduced. To foster saving 
and capital formation in the private sector, De’ Stefani drastically reduced 
wartime taxation on corporate profits and abolished the rule that stocks had 
to be registered in the owner’s name (De’ Stefani, 1926).  
Some fiscal measures adopted during this period clearly aimed at 
fostering the support of the middle class. Among them, a property tax 
reduction, the abrogation of the inheritance law and the liberalization of  
rents. With reference to customs policy, De’ Stefani worked to restore 
multilateralism in trade and to keep customs duties at moderate levels 
(Clough, 1964, 224-5) 
On the whole, fiscal consolidation was successful: speaking at the 
Chamber of deputies on May 30th 1923 and at Senate on December 8th of the 
same year11, de’ Stefani was able to announce that the task of balancing the 
budget had been nearly achieved. By far less effective, on the contrary, was 
                                                          
10 Parliamentary Papers (hence A.P.), Chamber of Deputies (hence Chamber), 25th 
November 1922, 8654-6. 
11 A.P., Chamber, 30th May 1923, 9508-11; Senate, 8th Dec. 1923, 5744-53. 
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his action on monetary and exchange rate stabilization. De’ Stefani had to 
support Bank of Italy’s bailout of the Banco di Roma and of other financial 
institutions which, mainly for political reasons, the fascist regime had 
decided not to let bankrupt. At the same time, he was unable to take 
concrete steps to consolidate the huge external debt accumulated during the 
war by Italy with its allies. Not surprisingly, the liquidity injected into the 
system to save the banks brought an increase of inflation, whilst adverse 
expectations fuelled a substantial devaluation of the lira. 
De’ Stefani reacted to this setback by adopting restrictionary measures 
on financial speculation, a policy which resulted in a serious stock market 
crash. In spite of a resolute defence of his policy at the Chamber of deputies 
on 2nd June12, this brought in July 1925 to his dismissal as a minister of 
finance. From this date, the phase of economic liberalism was quickly 
abandoned and replaced by the adoption of protectionist measures and a 
strengthening of State intervention in the economy.  
Starting from the mid-twenties, the regime strongly promoted also 
measures to foster agriculture, a crucial sector in terms of economic and 
social stability. The first, highly publicized initiative was the so called “battle 
for grain”, launched in 1925 and aimed at reducing the balance of trade 
deficit and at ensuring national self sufficiency in the consumption of corn 
(Tattara, 1973; Daneo, 1980, 119-22). This objective should have been 
achieved mainly by means of productivity increases and was only partially 
successful. Even more ambitious was a vast program of land reclamation 
and improvement (“bonifica integrale”) launched in December 1928 through 
the so called ‘legge Mussolini’. This law set objectives that went far beyond 
the traditional works of drainage of swampy land and the fight against 
malaria, in that it aimed to substitute extensive with intensive cultivation 
and to promote colonization in vast areas of the country, including 
potentially one fifth of the national territory. In this context, the government 
was in charge of the fundamental works of drainage and land reclamation; 
instead the landowners were responsible for the works aimed at increasing 
the productivity of the land and fostering its colonization (irrigation canals, 
rural buildings, drinking water supply). The government in this case helped 
with subsidies which covered a part of the expense (Daneo, 1980, 130).  
In spite of its denomination, the “Mussolini law” had been actually 
inspired by Arrigo Serpieri, by far the most gifted and authoritative agrarian 
economist in Italy at that time13. A leading expert in forestry and land 
                                                          
12 A.P., Chamber, 2nd June 1925, 4116-22. 
13 Arrigo Serpieri (Bologna, 1877−Florence, 1960) taught agricultural economics at the 
Universities of Perugia, Milan and Florence. In 1925 he founded the National Institute of 
Agricultural Economics in Florence, which he presided until the second world war and in 
1926 was appointed president of the “Accademia dei Georgofili”. In 1939 became member 
of the Senate. After the fall of fascism Serpieri was temporarily deprived of his 
 8 
reclamation, Serpieri had been appointed in 1923 undersecretary of State 
for agriculture in the first Mussolini ministry, a post he held until 1924, 
when he was elected to the Chamber of deputies. In these years he drafted 
important legislative measures on the redemption of mountain areas and on 
land reclamation and improvement. In 1929 he was appointed 
undersecretary in charge of the implementation of the “bonifica integrale”14 
and worked with great energy, documented by five detailed annual reports 
drew up by himself and distributed among all members of Parliament.  
Although the resources allocated by the government to the reclamation 
project were considerable, he wrote in his first report, these projects had to 
be selected with great care, according to a criterion of “maximum national 
utility” which included, in addition to economic utility, the supply of stable 
employment to a large number of temporary workers, rooting them 
permanently in a specific rural area (Serpieri, 1931, 194).  
In Serpieri’s intentions, therefore, the aim of the “bonifica integrale” 
was that of the transformation of large areas of Italian territory with the 
intention of establishing intensive production methods and promoting small 
or medium size farms. This would have helped in reducing the number of 
temporary agriculture workers, traditionally underemployed and prone to 
‘subversive’ propaganda, transforming them into wealthy peasants and 
sharecroppers faithful to the regime. 
 To this end, however, it was crucial that the major reclamation works 
borne by the State were accompanied by works of improvement by the 
landowners. He therefore promoted a new law, approved in 193315, which 
attributed the responsibility for the reclamation work to ad hoc institutions, 
the consortia. These were bodies led, as a rule, by administrators elected by 
the landowners of the area but supervised and controlled by the ministry of 
agriculture. Among the preliminary tasks of the consortium there was that of 
elaborating a ‘general plan of land reclamation’ which included the public 
works required but also the plan of agrarian transformation to be realized 
by the landowners 
The owners who were not able to carry out the works to which they 
were entitled, would have been expropriated and the property of their land 
transferred to private capitalists or to foundations (the most active during 
                                                                                                                                                                          
professorship at the University. His academic writings focus on forestry, land reclamation 
and on the evolution of Italian agriculture. Cf. among others: Serpieri, 1930; 1935; 1957. 
On Serpieri’s life and work cf. Dini, 2010; Misiani, 2018. For an overview of academic 
research on agricultural economics in interwar Italy cf. Zaganella, 2015. 
14 This happened in the framework of a significant organizational change inside the 
executive: the ministry of national economy, which had been deprived of most non 
agricultural competences in favour of the ministry of corporations, was renamed ministry 
of agriculture and forestry and entrusted, as we will see later, to Giacomo Acerbo. 
15 “Testo unico sulla bonifica integrale”, 13th February 1933, no. 215. 
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these years was the “Opera nazionale combattenti” that carried out the 
colonization of the Agro Pontino). 
Serpieri recognized that expropriation was an extreme sanction16; 
indeed the ongoing economic crisis had aggravated the position of many 
owners, who did not have sufficient financial means to complete the work 
for which they were responsible. A possible solution, in his view, should 
have been for them to sell part of their land and improve with the proceeds 
the productivity of the remainig part of the property.  
On these aspects, as we will see, a strong contrast with the class of 
owners would soon have been triggered in Parliament17. 
It is worth remembering that Serpieri could hardly have carried out his 
reform projects without the support of Giacomo Acerbo, who had been 
appointed minister of agriculture and forestry in September 1929. This 
ministry, by the way, had been constituted on that occasion, unifying the 
control of agricultural issues managed since 1923 by the ministry of national 
economy18: a measure interpreted by many observers as a further sign of 
the crucial role attributed to the agricultural sector by the regime. 
A leading member of the fascist party and a close collaborator of 
Mussolini who, as already mentioned, had entrusted him with the drafting of 
the electoral law of 1923, Acerbo was also an authoritative agrarian 
economist19. Called to join the government in 1929, he had supported 
Serpieri’s appointment as undersecretary and shared his vision on the 
subject of land reclamation. 
                                                          
16 In his opinion, however, this measure was justified in the case of owners who were 
“stubbornly failing to fulfil the duties that the fascist State attributes to property as a social 
function” (Serpieri, 1933, 80). 
17 In a speech held at the Senate in 1933 Francesco Rota, a landowner and silk 
entrepreneur of northeast Italy, openly criticized Serpieri’s approach: “Fascism guarantees 
the right of ownership that is, despite all the declining bolshevism, the cornerstone of our 
civilization. These doctrinal statements of large, indeterminate expropriations are 
dangerous” (A.P., Senate, 21th March 1933, 5933). 
18 In the previous years the ministry of national economy had been deprived of most of its 
non agricultural competences in favour of the ministry of corporations and was therefore 
suppressed. 
19 Giacomo Acerbo (Loreto Aprutino, 1888 – Rome, 1969) graduated in agronomy at the 
University of Pisa in 1912. In the postwar period he started an academic career as 
assistant professor in political economy at the University of Rome and at he same time 
took part to political activity as an active member of the fascist party. Elected at the 
Chamber of deputies in 1921, he became a close collaborator of Mussolini. In the 
meantime he carried on academic work in agricultural economics and in 1928 became 
professor on that discipline at the High school of commerce, later Faculty of economics, 
University of Rome. Minister of Agriculture and forestry till January 1935, on that year was 
appointed president of the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome. Member of the 
Great fascist council, in July 1943 voted against Mussolini. Cf. Parisella, 1988. 
 10
As soon as he took office in his ministry, however, the biggest challenge 
he had to face was the collapse of the prices of the agricultural products and 
of farm incomes as a consequence of the world depression. His report on the 
budget of his ministry, held in the Chamber of deputies in April 1930, for 
example, is dominated by the theme of the sharp reduction in the prices of 
basic agricultural goods such as wheat, wine, livestock products. While not 
denying the seriousness of the problem, Acerbo expressed at that time the 
confidence that the crisis was temporary, bound to be solved through a 
decrease of stocks and a reduction in nominal wages20. 
The following three years were characterized by the persistence and 
even worsening of the economic depression. The parliamentary papers in 
this period document several severe complains − albeit usually tempered by 
declarations of allegiance to the regime −and pressing requests of help by 
the representatives of the farmers and landowners, presented during the 
discussion of the annual budgets of the ministry21.  
In two encompassing speeches given respectively in the Chamber of 
deputies and the Senate, respectively in February and March 193322, Acerbo 
recognized the gravity of the crisis while claiming the validity of the criteria 
adopted by the government “to defend and strenghten” the sector. The most 
serious problem, he agreed, was the collapse of the prices of most 
agricultural products, which in turn had led many farmers to face a 
“reduction in agricultural revenues below production costs”. The situation 
appeared to be particularly serious with regard to livestock farming and silk 
and wine production. The government, maintained this time Acerbo, had not 
waited for “the slow unfolding of market rebalancing forces” to bring back 
equilibrium23. On the contrary, it had defended national producers by 
preventing, through import duties and other measures, domestic prices 
from falling at the international level. It also promoted the improvement of 
production techniques and the increase in the use of chemical fertilizers. 
Another key problem, partially connected with the previous one, was 
that of indebtedness. The total debt of Italian agriculture, Acerbo estimated, 
amounted to 9-10 billion lira, out of a total value of production of about 25-
30 billion. This sum, although not excessively high at an aggregate level, was 
strongly concentrated in some regions: in particular, Emilia, Lazio, Veneto. 
In this case the government had intervened by granting aid to ‘meritorious’ 
                                                          
20 A.P. Senate, 9th April 1930, 2346-49. 
21 Complains focused on the collapse of the prices of the main agricultural goods but also 
on the high tax burden and the high interest rates on loans to farmers. Cf. A.P., Chamber, 
21th February 1933, 7672-7705; A.P., Senate, 21th March 1933, 5926-52.  
22 A.P., Chamber, 24th February 1933, 7804-18; A.P., Senate, 24th March 1933, 6001-16. 
23
 A.P., Chamber, 24th February 1933, 7805. 
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farmers: abandoning them to ruin would have been a “serious political error 
as well as an economic one”24 
In his speech held at the Senate, Acerbo strongly defended the project 
of “integral reclamation” coordinated by Serpieri. In three years it has 
allowed to carry out reclamation works for an amount of 1600 million and 
to ensure employment to tens of thousands of workers. The execution of the 
works by the State had to be followed now by those due by the private 
sector: if a few of them were unable to do so due to lack of capital, they 
would have had to voluntarily give up part of their property to those who 
had that will, before they were forced to do so25.  
On this point, however, a tough contrast soon arised between the 
representatives of the landowners in Parliament and the ministry of 
agriculture. Until 1933-34, the norms on the obligations of the landowners 
had remained a dead letter. In December 1934, however, Serpieri presented 
in Parliament a draft law to make these norms effective. This new law, 
maintained Serpieri and Acerbo intervening at the Chamber, did not intend 
to violate the right of property; it simply reaffirmed the social duties of the 
owners towards the nation26. After an extensive debate, the proposal was 
indeed approved by the Chamber of deputies but was then put into a 
standstill, as a consequence of the fierce opposition by the landowners. 
This setback, almost unprecedented during the regime, led, in January 
1935, to the resignation of Acerbo and Serpieri. They were replaced 
respectively by Edmondo Rossoni − an ambitious leader of the fascist trade 
unionism who, however, possessed hardly any notion of agronomy27 − as a 
new minister of agriculture, and by Gabriele Canelli, a lawyer from Apulia 
who enjoyed the trust of the landowners, as undersecretary for land 
reclamation. 
Canelli maintained this position until his death in April 1937. It is not 
surprising that, for at least two years, the land reclamation initiatives were 
radically scaled down. In the same period, probably as a consequence of an 
implicit deal between the landowners and Mussolini himself (Daneo, 1980, 
132-3) most of the resources previously invested in agriculture were 
anyway diverted by the regime to finance the war in Ethiopia and the 
rearmament process. 
                                                          
24 Ibidem, 7813-16. 
25 A.P., Senate, 24th March 1933, 6013-15. 
26
 A.P. Chamber, 12th Dec. 1934, 494-507. 
27 For a tranchant judgement of Rossoni’s work at the ministry cf. the Diaries of Giuseppe 
Tassinari, at that time undersecretary of agriculture. In this text, recently published, 
Tassinari judged Rossoni “an incompetent and slacker minister, concerned exclusively 
with his own interests” (Tassinari, 2019, 68). 
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To partially compensate this standstill to agricultural policy, in January 
1935, Giuseppe Tassinari28 a first rate agricultural economist, was appointed 
undersecretary of the same ministry, in addition to Canelli. In May 1937 
Tassinari also took the responsibility for land reclamation and finally, at the 
end of October 1939, was appointed minister of agriculture. 
At the beginning of his scientific training, in the early 1920s, Tassinari 
had been strongly influenced by Serpieri’s teaching; after 1930-31, however, 
he started to criticize the model of land reclamation advocated by the latter, 
as, in his opinion, it relied too much on the goodwill of the landowners. Once 
in the government, he advocated instead a project of land reclamation 
focused on specific uncultivated areas in Southern Italy: these should have 
been expropriated by the State, provided with adequate infrastructure build 
by public agencies and transformed into small and medium size farms. In 
this period the new priority for Mussolini had become indeed the pursuit of 
national self sufficiency (‘autarky’) and then in 1939-40, this time 
overcoming the resistance of the local landowners, he gave his assent to an 
ambitious plan to expropriate and transform large properties in Sicily 
(Zaganella, 2010). At that time, however, Italy was sliding towards the war 
and this project could not be completed. 
 
 
4. The economists at the Chamber of Deputies  
 
As mentioned above, thanks to the Acerbo law and to systematic 
violence and intimidation, in 1924 the fascist party managed to gain a large 
majority in the Lower House. Several deputies, however, were elected in the 
ranks of the opposition parties. Among them, three were university 
professors in economics: Angelo Mauri, a catholic intellectual, Arturo 
Labriola, member of the socialist party and Antonio Graziadei, a co-founder 
in 1921 of the Italian communist party. As a result of the dramatic sequence 
of events that led in 1924-26 to the abolition of fundamental political rights 
and the establishment of an indisputed personal dictatorship by Mussolini, 
                                                          
28
 Giuseppe Tassinari (Perugia, 1891−Salò, 1944) taught agricultural economics at the 
Universities of Perugia and Bologna, where he became full professor in 1926, and forestry 
at the National Institute of Agricultural Economics in Florence, presided by Serpieri. From 
1929 till 1939 was member of the Chamber of deputies and then, from 1939, of the 
Chamber of fasces and corporations. After September 1943, albeit critical of the fascist 
ruling élite, which he judged to be corrupt and incompetent, he adhered to the “Repubblica 
Sociale Italiana”, the puppet State created by Mussolini with the help of the nazi regime 
and died in Salò in 1944 during an aerial attack (cf. Zaganella, 2010). In his academic 
writings Tassinari focused on the structural problems of the Italian agriculture, on the 
distribution of income among Italian farmers and on corporatism (Tassinari, 1931; 1933; 
1937).  
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their role in Parliament, however, was bound to be de facto ineffective.  In 
the summer of 1924, after the kidnapping and killing by the fascists of the 
socialist leader Giacomo Matteotti, both Mauri and Labriola joined the 
strategy adopted by the socialist and centrist opposition to boycott 
parliamentary work until violence had ceased (so called “Aventine 
secession”). It is not surprising then that the parliamentary proceedings do 
not include in this period any speech by Mauri, whilst Labriola held only a 
minor speech, in April 1924, against an attempt by the majority to change 
the composition of the permanent commissions.   
Graziadei, together with the communist party, did not join the boycott 
and continued his opposition from inside the Lower House, where he took 
the floor to attack the economic policy of the government. In a speech given 
in March 192529, in particular, he denounced the continuous increase in the 
cost of living in Italy, in a context in which wages had remained unchanged 
or had even decreased. This, he maintained, had resulted in a sharp 
deterioration in the standard of living of the workers. At the same time, 
Graziadei lamented the strong depreciation of the lira which had brought 
increases in the prices of imported goods and higher inflation. No less severe 
was his criticism of De’ Stefani fiscal policy and government’s decision to 
favour the bailout of a few credit institutions linked to the regime.  
These sharp remarks, which identified several weak points of the 
fascist policy, were of course not welcomed by Mussolini. In October 1926, 
in the framework of a tightening of the dictatorship, all opposition members 
were expelled from the Chamber.  
After this date, then, the remaining voices of the anti-fascist opposition 
were silenced. This does not mean, however, that the Chamber of deputies 
became simply an amplifier of the duce’s will. Whilst from the second half of 
the 1930s conformism and even flattery became dominant, before this 
period the debate on the floor still reflected different positions within 
Fascism. 
Among the deputies who, while adering to fascism, maintained a 
critical and nonconformist view, one of the most stimulating is undoubtedly 
the corporatist economist Agostino Lanzillo.  
Lanzillo was a leading exponent of the “revolutionary syndicalism”, a 
movement which maintained that factories should be owned and managed 
by the people who worked in them and which drew inspiration from the 
ideas of Georges Sorel30. After graduating in law at the University of Rome, 
                                                          
29 A.P., Chamber, 11th March 1925, 2439-45. 
30 Lanzillo (Reggio Calabria, 1886−Milano, 1952) taught as assistant professor at the 
University “Bocconi” of Milan and at the University of Rome; in 1923 got the chair of 
political economy at the University of Cagliari. From 1934 was professor in the same 
discipline at University “Ca’ Foscari”, Venice. In his original and controversial writings 
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he started a successful academic career as an economist but took also an 
active part to the political debate, becoming an outspoken critic of the 
socialist orthodoxy and advocating a synthesis between syndicalism and 
nationalism. In 1914-15 he actively campaigned in favour of Italy’s 
participation to the war and then adhered very early to fascism, becoming a 
columnist of Popolo d’Italia, the official newspaper of the fascist movement.  
In 1924 was elected at the Chamber of deputies and the following year 
became a member of the so called “Commissione dei diciotto”, a committee 
selected by Mussolini to shape Italy’s political institutions according to the 
new regime (cf. De Felice, 1968, 42-46; Aquarone, 1965, 52 sgg). In this 
committee, he became supporter of a radical view of corporatism, seen as a 
system supporting the self-government of the productive categories. In his 
view, the corporations, not the government should take the key decisions in 
the spheres of production and distribution. This position, hostile to statism 
and centralization, brought to a gradual marginalization of Lanzillo inside 
the regime .  
His speeches at Chamber of deputies, between 1924 and 1929, reflect 
his views of a ‘leftist’ fascist intellectual. On March 1925, commenting on the 
political situation31, he expressed strong criticism to the “Aventine 
secession”. The events of the First world war demonstrated, maintained 
Lanzillo, that liberalism and democracy had failed: on that occasion the 
national interests had been defended not by the majority of population, who 
was against the war, but by a pugnacious minority, led by the fascists. This 
movement had therefore the right and  indeed the duty to lead the country 
until his programme had been fulfilled. To this aim, violent means had been 
used in the past and would have to be used in the future; in Lanzillo’s view, 
however, fascist violence was “ennobled by idealistic motivations” and led 
by a clear will to modernize the country32. 
In another key speech, held in December 1925, Lanzillo commented 
critically the proposal, drafted by Alfredo Rocco, aimed at enacting a strict 
control by the government of both trade unions and employers’ 
organizations33. According to this proposal, which anticipated the so called 
“Charter of Labour”, only strictly fascist workers’ and employers’ 
organizations were entitled to draw ‘collective’ labour contracts, i.e. deals 
whose provisions were binding also for non unionized workers.  To this aim, 
each area of activity could be legally represented only by a single, fascist, 
workers’ and employers’ organization, which had to apply for a formal 
recognition by the government and be submitted to continuous control. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(Lanzillo 1918; 1936; 1937) he focused on the crisis of liberalism and socialism and 
analysed the perspectives of capitalism after the Great depression. 
31 A.P., Chamber, 10th March 1925, 2392-6. 
32 Ibidem, 2395. 
33 A.P., Chamber, 5th Dec. 1925, 4849-55. 
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Labour conflicts and the fixing of wages had to be dealt by special judiciary 
courts (‘magistratura del lavoro’). Strikes and lockouts were forbidden and 
punished as a crime. 
In his speech Lanzillo expressed support to the broad principles 
underlying the above mentioned proposal; as a matter of fact, however, he 
raised several critical observations. According to the syndicalist programme, 
indeed, Lanzillo wished that the newly organized unions would take a 
leading role in the production process and in policy decisions. As a 
consequence, he expressed reservations to government’s control of 
everyday activity of the unions and opposed the view that the conflicting 
interests of workers and employers, including the determination of wages, 
should be entrusted to a specific labour judiciary. The very concept of  ‘fair 
wage’, as well as that of fair price, he told the Chamber, was metaphysical. 
Struggle for income distribution and even strikes, provided they were not 
motivated by political reasons, were instrumental in fostering efficiency and 
productivity.  
Given Lanzillo’s heterodox views inside fascism and his independence 
of judgement, it is not surprising that in the following elections, scheduled in 
1929, he was not included in the list of candidates to the Parliament (De 
Felice, 1968, 476). In the 1930s he became increasingly at odds with 
Mussolini’s policies and focused on academic work at the University of 
Venice, writing several essays on corporatism and on the challenges facing  
capitalism after the great depression. Some of these were published on 
Critica Fascista, the journal edited by Giuseppe Bottai.   
Another leading theorist of corporatism was Gino Arias, professor of 
political economy at the Universities of Genoa, Florence and Rome34. In 
1924-25, similarly to Lanzillo, he was selected by Mussolini to take part to a 
key committee delegated to institutional reforms (Comitato dei diciotto): on 
that circumstance, he supported a moderate and more ‘orthodox’ view of the 
role of syndicates: to perform their functions, these should obtain indeed a 
formal recognition by the government; in each productive sector, however 
several syndicates had to compete to represent workers’ interests. In the 
                                                          
34 Gino Arias was born in Florence in 1879 by a Jewish family. A prolific writer, he 
published between 1901 and 1906 several essays and monographs on the history of 
medieval economic and social institutions (cf. Arias, 1901; 1905). In the following years he 
focused on the analysis of economic institutions and phenomena in an historical 
perspective and in 1909 he got a chair of political economy at the University of Genoa, 
where he taught till 1924, when he moved to the University of Florence. During the 1920s, 
Arias adhered to fascism and wrote several essays on the theoretical foundations of 
corporatism (Arias, 1930) and on the ‘Chart of labour’, a key document elaborated in 1926 
by Giuseppe Bottai. In 1936 he moved to the University of Rome to become professor of 
political economy at the faculty of law. On October 1938, after the enforcement by the 
regime of the racist laws against the Jews, he was forced to emigrate to Argentina, where 
he died shortly after his arrival, in the 1940. Cf. Ottonelli, 2012. 
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following years he became a leading representative of the fascist economic 
and social doctrine: in this capacity he wrote regularly for Popolo d’Italia, the 
official newspaper of the fascist party and for Gerarchia, the journal founded 
by Mussolini and directed by Margherita Sarfatti  (Ottonelli, 2012, 31 sgg). 
Member of the Chamber of deputies since 1934, Arias took an activ part 
to the work of the committee on finance, where he drafted several internal 
documents. In the general assembly, however, he took the floor only on a 
few occasions, during the discussion of the budget of the ministry of 
corporations or as a speaker of the committee on finance. In March 1935, for 
example, he gave a speech to exalt the ‘Chart of labour’ which, he 
maintained, “transformed syndicates in the most powerful instrument of 
order and justice” and laid the foundation of corporatism35. Arias stressed 
the need for corporations to have their own research and documentation 
centres, in order to be able to analyse the problems of the sector  they had to 
coordinate and to set new legislative and policy measures. The aim of the 
new corporative order, maintained Arias, was not to suppress private 
initiative, quite the contrary. Private firms, however, should ‘spontaneously’ 
conform to the new corporative ‘spirit’, modifying accordingly their methods 
of management, their relations with labour force and becoming conscious of 
their social duties. Interestingly, this point was met with perplexity and 
criticism by a few members of the Chamber: the parliamentary proceedings 
report “interruptions” and somehow ironic comments36.  
In a speech held on March 1936 Arias provides a very optimistic view 
of the role and future developments of the corporative system37. The 
corporations, he maintains, would have “disciplined the entire national 
economy”38. They were “public institutions” whose role was to fulfil key 
regulating and law making functions under the coordination of the head of 
government. As public institutions, they should have sufficient 
personnel/civil servants. This bureaucratic apparatus, however, should have 
been reduced to a minimum so as not to deprive corporations of their 
flexibility. A partial exception to this framework was constituted, Arias 
acknowledged, by the steel and mechanical industries: given their 
importance for the national defence, these had to be placed under the 
                                                          
35
 A.P. , Chamber, 28th March 1935, 1207-12. 
36 In his speech Arias mentioned the need to tackle the organization of new “corporate 
firms”. To this point another deputy, Nazzareno Mezzetti, interrupted him: “a corporate 
firm? Could you explain what does it mean? Please, tell us” (A.P., 28th March 1935, 1209). 
Also an observation by Arias that the newly founded high schools aimed at forming the 
cadres of the fascist syndicates did not attract enough participants among workers’ 
representatives was met with irony by the floor: “This is because the trade unionists have 
a better preparation than the teachers”, a deputy observed (Ibidem, 1935). 
37
 A.P. Chamber, 26th March 1936, 2521-26. 
38
 Ibidem, 2521. 
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control of the State. Also in this case, however, Arias hoped for coordination 
with the the corporations39.  
As we know, however, the organization of the Italian economy 
developed in a different direction from that desired by Arias and the 
corporatists: from the second half of the 1930s, Mussolini's priority became 
the transformation of the Italian economy into an instrument aimed at 
achieving objectives of military expansion and aggression. In this context, a 
centralized control of productive activity and of foreign trade was needed: 
corporatism, with his complex decision-making process could even become 
an obstacle. Arias anyway did not take part to this last phase of the fascist 
parable: at the end of 1938, following the adoption by the regime of the 
notorious racist laws, he was stripped, as a Jew, of all his institutional 
positions and expelled from the Parliament and from the University. 
During the 1930s, as mentioned, critical debate inside the Chamber of 
deputies rarefied and conformism became increasingly dominant in 
deputies’ speeches. A symptomatic case of this tendency is that of Gaetano 
Zingali, professor of statistics and public economics at the University of 
Catania and author of several essays on demography, on the Italian taxation 
system, on the measurement of wealth and income in Southern Italy40.  
Elected at the Chamber of deputies in 1929 and again in 1934, he gave 
several speeches in which he confirmed his role as an expert in applied 
statistics and national accounting but also his acritical support of the regime  
In December 1929, for example, he intervened during the general discussion 
on the budget of the Ministry of finance for the year 1927-28, a session 
which was attended also by Mussolini. This budget had been introduced to 
the general assembly by Gino Olivetti, speaker of the finance committee and 
also. In his speech Olivetti, who was secretary-general of the employers’ 
association (‘Confindustria’) and therefore a leading representative of the 
industrialists’ view, pointed out to two worrying phenomena which had 
negatively influenced during the previous year the Italian economy: an 
increase in fiscal pressure and a decrease of national income. This was 
indeed an implicit but substantial criticism to government’s economic 
policy. Commenting on Olivetti’s speech, Zingali denied that the increase in 
fiscal revenues, which had indeed happened, was the consequence of an 
heavier fiscal burden41. On the contrary, it had to be interpreted as the result 
of an enlargement of the taxing basis and a severe reduction of tax evasion. 
                                                          
39 In the same speech Arias denied that the national economic independence, advocated by 
Mussolini, could coincide with isolation: on the contrary, he maintained, international 
trade should continue to perform a crucial function (Ibidem, 2523). 
40 Cf. Zingali, 1924; 1925; 1933. Gaetano Zingali (Francofonte, 1894−Catania, 1975) taught 
statistics at the University of Catania since 1925 and became full professor of public 
economics at the same University in 1936. 
41  A.P., Chamber, 5th Dec. 1925, 1387-89. 
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The latter, he denounced quoting official data, had been widespread among 
the professionals, particularly in Southern Italy, till 1922-2342. Resolute 
action adopted by Fascist government, however, had curbed this 
phenomenon. In his speech, which was commented favourably by Mussolini, 
Zingali quoted also data on production to deny a widespread decrease of 
income43. 
In another lengthy speech in which he combined professional use of 
available statistical data with flattery and adulation towards the regime, 
Zingali praised the public expenditure policy pursued by fascism, denying 
that this had brought to an increase of aggregate public expenditure and a 
worsening of the budget deficit: rather fascism had promoted a more 
efficient use of public resources with the aim to improve the welfare of the 
Italian people, in particular the poorest part of the population44. 
 Strong support for the regime, deriving however in this case by 
sincere ideological committment, was manifested also by Attilio da Empoli, 
professor of public finance and corporative economics at the Universities of 
Bari, Messina and Neaples45, member of the Chamber of deputies in the 
years 1934-39 and of the Chamber of fasces and corporations from 1939 till 
1943. 
In Parliament da Empoli intervened mainly on topics connected with 
public finance, advocating a moderate redistribution of income and 
measures aimed at reducing inequality and promoting “social justice” (Di 
Napoli, 2012) . In March 1935, for example, commenting the budget forecast 
of the ministry of education46, he suggested that school and university fees 
should be charged in proportion to household’s income, rather than being 
fixed in amount. Fees, he observed, did not cover the entire cost of education 
and were integrated with resources deriving from taxation, including taxes 
                                                          
42 Ibidem, 1389-91. 
43 In December 1930 Zingali gave its support to a measure enacted by the government 
with the aim of reducing nominal wages of civil servants, arguing optimistically that this 
cut was more than compensated by the decrease of the prices of the goods consumed by 
workers together with a reduction of rents decided by the government. A.P., Chamber, 11th 
Dec., 1930, 3656-62. 
44 A.P., Chamber, 10th May 1932, 7034-55. After the second world war Zingali, in a 
compelling example of political opportunism, became a member of the liberal party and 
run for election in the democratic parliament, this time unsuccessfully. 
45 Attilio Da Empoli (Reggio Calabria, 1904−Napoli, 1948) was author of innovative essays 
in public finance. From 1929 till 1931, he completed his intellectual formation at the 
London School of Economics and then at Columbia University, Berkeley and Chicago. In 
1936 he got a chair in public economics at the University of Bari; then taught at the 
Universities of Messina and Neaples. A committed nationalist and fascist, in 1935 he 
volunteered in the war in Ethiopia and, in 1941, in the campaign of Greece. In 1943, 
however, he distanced himself from fascism and in 1944 he enlisted in the reconstituted 
Italian army that fought alongside the Anglo-Americans. Cf. Faucci, 1985; Fusco, 2012. 
46 A.P., Chamber, 6th March 1935, 856-64. 
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on consumption, payed also by poor people who normally did not enrol in 
university. As a consequence, the education of the more affluent section of 
the society was subsidized, at least in part, by the less advantaged section.  
More radical appears his proposal for a reform of the Italian tax system 
that he put forward in May 1935 during the discussion of the provisional 
budget of the Ministry of finance47. In this circumstance he suggested a 
system of progressive taxation based on the principle of equal marginal 
sacrifice. Tax rates, however, should not reach levels so high as to 
discourage savings. 
Da Empoli took the floor also in December 1936, at the time of the 
approval of the government decree of October 5th deliberating a substantial 
devaluation of the lira after a round of devaluations enacted by the 
monetary authorities of the major industrialized countries. In his speech48, 
Da Empoli placed the realignment of the lira within the framework of the 
monetary policy pursued by the regime since the stabilization process of 
1926-27 (‘quota novanta’). This latter measure, he maintained, had placed 
the Italian economy on a solid and non-inflationary footing and had made it 
possible to mitigate the adverse effect on real economy deriving from the 
deflationary pressures of the 1930s. However, the devaluations of the pound 
and the dollar, followed by realignments of most currencies, had made the 
search of a new equilibrium exchange rate of the lira unavoidable. 
In May 1938, commenting on the floor the budget of the ministry of 
finance for 1938-39, he used enthusiastic tones: “what comes to your 
attention is the budget for the third year of Mussolini’s empire: a Roman, 
fascist and corporate empire”49. In his speech da Empoli returned to the 
need to strenghten the progressiveness  of the tax system in order to reduce 
income inequalities and to increase tax deductions to large families. His 
overall judgement, anyway, was very positive: the budget was inspired by 
the principles of sound finance that “had alone allowed the means necessary 
for the conquest of the empire”.50  
After July 1943, the disastrous conduct of the war by Mussolini, a direct 
consequence of his totalitarian management of power, led da Empoli, who 
fought during the conflict as an army officer, to radically rethink his support 
for the regime and to become an active antifascist. 
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48 A.P., Chamber, 15th Dec. 1936, 3111-3114. 
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5. Between residual autonomy and increasing regimentation: being an 
economist at the fascist Senate 
 
Also the Senate, as mentioned, was submitted from the late 1920s to a 
process of fascistization. In this institution, however, the legacy of the pre-
fascist past was stronger and the process of substituting the older, mainly 
liberal-oriented senators with politically more reliable new members was 
undoubtedly slower.  
Among the representatives of the liberal prefascist élite, one of the 
most outstanding was Luigi Einaudi. Appointed to the Senate in 1919, 
Einaudi manifested his dissent by attending rarely to the sessions and 
avoiding from taking part in the discussions on the floor. Furthermore, in 
1928 he voted against the new electoral law promoted by Alfredo Rocco and 
in 1935 to a Senate agendum in favour of Ethiopia’s war (Faucci, 1986, 215). 
Another influential economist, who came from a different approach 
but, as Einaudi, was alien to the fascist ideology, was Achille Loria, an 
eclectic thinker influenced by the German historical school (but also by Marx 
and Darwin) and author of original, albeit controversial, essays and 
monographs in which he tried to explain the economic and political 
evolution of societies on the basis of the abundance or scarcity of land51. 
Member of the Accademia dei Lincei since 1901, he was appointed to the 
Senate in October 1919.  
In spite of the fact that, being alien to fascist ideology, he was subjected 
to increasing isolation, Loria took an active part in the work of the Senate. In 
March 1930, in a speech delivered in the presence of Mussolini during a 
debate on a law aimed at implementing the “National Council of 
Corporations”, a new constitutional body, he expressed a favourable opinion 
on the role played by corporations on the economic and social system of 
Italy, as they could guarantee a continuous coordination between workers 
and employers52. In his analysis, Loria interpreted corporatism as a 
manifestation of the intervention of the State in the economy: as such, he 
                                                          
51 Achille Loria was born in Mantua to a Jewish family in 1857. After graduating in law at 
the University of Bologna, he continued his studies in Pavia, Berlin and London. In 1881 
became professor political economy at the University of Siena and then moved to the 
Universities of Padua (1891) and Turin (1902), where he taught until his retirement in 
1932. He died in November 1943 at Luserna San Giovanni, a mountain village not far from 
Turin. A prolific writer, Loria was acclaimed as an outstanding thinker during the 1880s 
and 1890s to be later subjected to harsh criticism by such authors as Benedetto Croce and 
Antonio Gramsci. Some of his works were translated in English and French and exerted a 
significant influence abroad. He was Italian correspondent of the Royal Economic Society 
and honorary fellow of the American Economic Association. Cf. Benson 1950; Faucci and 
Perri 2003. 
52 A.P., Senate, 13th March 1930, 1932. 
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argued, this issue had been already raised by several XIX century 
economists, in particular the German Kathedersozialisten. In the same 
speech, however, Loria warned against the claims made by some supporters 
of corporatism that this would finally overcome the clash between social 
classes. The debate itself that had accompanied the approval of the same 
legislative proposal in the Chamber of deputies, observed Loria, had 
revealed that on crucial aspects the representatives of entrepreneurs and 
those of syndicates had different, even conflicting point of view53. To some 
extent, he added, these conflicts were indeed unaivodable and even 
beneficial. 
In another remarkable speech, delivered in the Senate in May 1935, 
Loria focused on the Italian banking system, expressing a very positive 
evaluation of the legislative interventions that led to the establishment of 
the “Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale” (IRI)54. Thanks to these 
measures, stated Loria, it had been possible to overcome the main factors of 
instability affecting the major Italian banks, namely their tendency to invest 
short-term deposits in long-term loans. The problem was that, in many 
cases, orthodox short-term operations were insufficient to guarantee 
adequate profits to the banks, which could then be induced to engage in 
speculative operations. The optimal solution would have been to limit the 
number of banks by law, allowing the surviving banks to operate 
satisfactorily. 
In the following three years, from 1935 to 1938, “physical and moral 
pains”55 prevented Loria from taking part in the work of the Senate. In 
October 1938, then, he was struck, as a Jew, by the anti-Semitic legislation 
imposed by the regime. In an heartfelt letter to the President of the Senate, 
he recalled his profound patriotism, adding that he was confident that his 
family, which “had lived in Italy for centuries and had always given all its 
energy to the service of the country” would be exempted from persecution. 
As a matter of fact, Mussolini decided to ‘discriminate’, in other word to 
exempt from the most odious consequences of the anti-semitic legislation all 
senators of Jewish origin (Gentile, 2002, 88-89). However, this measure was 
not fully implemented and, anyway, the wound inflicted to him could hardly 
be healed: Loria retired to a small town near Turin where he died in 
November 1943. 
The other two economists in Senate, Pietro Sitta and Federico Flora, 
whose intellectual formation was based on economic liberalism, on the 
                                                          
53 Ibidem, 1935-6. This statement caused an abrupt comment by Mussolini, who attended 
the session: “We never ruled out these [contrasts]”, he told the Senators, briefly 
interrupting Loria. 
54
 A.P. Senate, 28th May 1935, 1317-21. 
55 Senate archives, Letter of Achille Loria to the President of the Senate, 31th Oct. 1938. 
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contrary, during the 1920s adhered to fascism and put their intellectual 
skills at the service of the regime, by playing an important role as experts. 
Pietro Sitta56 was an agricultural economist, author of renowned 
essays and monographs on land and agricultural credit and on taxation of 
landed property.  From the first decade of the twentieth century, he 
accompanied this work as scholar with an intense activity in Parliament and 
at the government: he joined the Chamber of deputies in 1915 and was re-
elected in the following two legislatures until 1924, when he was appointed 
Senator. In 1919 he held government positions as undersecretary at the 
ministry of agriculture and then at the ministry of industry and trade. In the 
postwar period then, he approached Mussolini’s regime and in May 1925 
became part of the fascist party.  
In Senate Sitta took an active part in the discussion and was member 
of several committees. In May 1930 he took the floor during the discussion 
of the budget of the Ministry of Corporations to address issues relating to 
social security and social assistance which, he recalled, had passed under the 
jurisdiction of that ministry. In his speech, Sitta took the opportunity to 
praise the results achieved by fascism in this field but wondered whether 
the ministry had sufficient resources to cope with the new tasks, with 
particular reference to the inspection and supervision of public and public 
institutions under its jurisdiction57. 
In March 1931 he intervened on the problem of agricultural credit, a 
few years after the approval of a comprehensive bill58 that had benefited 
from “appropriate observations of the Senate”59. According to Sitta, this law 
had considerably improved the conditions for granting credit to the farmers. 
However, there was room for further improvement, especially to avoid the 
danger of over-indebtedness in the sector and to control interest rates and 
the high costs of expertise charged by some credit institutions60.  
Federico Flora, professor at the University of Bologna from 1910 till 
193761, was an highly reputed expert of public services management, public 
                                                          
56 Pietro Sitta (Ferrara, 1866 − Ivi, 1947) graduated at High School of Commerce “Ca’ 
Foscari” of Venice. In 1902 became full professor of political economy at the University of 
Ferrara where he taught until retirement and where he held the position of rector for 
several years. He wrote several essays and monographs on agricultural economics (cf. 
Sitta, 1895; 1933). He was member of the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) and 
corresponding member of “Accademia dei Georgofili”. Cf. Morselli, 1948. 
57 A.P., Senate, 26th May 1930, 2598-2602. 
58 Law 29th July 1928, no. 2085. 
59  A.P. Senate, 25th March 1931, 3523. 
60 Ibidem, 3523-3525. 
61 Federico Flora (Pordenone, 1867 − Chiusi, 1958) was professor of public finance at the 
University of Catania (since 1904) and Bologna, where he taught until 1937. His academic 
writings include an influential handbook of public finance (Manuale di Scienza delle 
Finanze, first edition 1893) and several essays on public debt management, pauperism, 
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debt and exchange rates policies. As mentioned, he had a liberal background 
(he drew inspiration from Francesco Ferrara and other Italian liberal 
thinkers). From the second half of the 1920s, however, he gradually 
approached Mussolini’s regime: in December 1929 he became a member of 
the “National association of fascist university professors” and in July 1933 
he joined the fascist party. This undoubtedly facilitated his appointment as 
Senator, which took place in February 1934.   
In Senate he carried out an intense activity, as a speaker and 
commentator of several legislative proposals . From 1939 till 1943 he took 
part in the work of the Committee on Finance. 
In May 1935 he spoke on the budget of State railways62, a subject, he 
warned, that deserved the utmost attention not only for the size of this 
account but also for the serious repercussions it had on the Treasury, which 
by law appropriated the surpluses but also assumed the operating deficits of 
the sector. Now, until the end of the 1920s the railways administration 
realized a surplus. With the depression, in the early 1930s, the volume of 
traffic had fallen by more than a third. This had resulted in a deficit of 900 
million lira in the year 1935-36, half of the total of the public sector deficit, 
and had caused widespread concern among public opinion which was 
increasingly considering railways as a burden. This point of view however, 
maintained Flora, was utterly unfair: if an overall calculation would have 
been made of the costs and benefits stemming from the railways, the result 
would have been hugely positive. 
In December Flora intervened on the decree adopted by the 
government on 5th October to devalue the lira. In his speech Flora 
maintained that, following the recent devaluation of the French franc and of 
the leading international currencies, this measure was inevitable: “monetary 
nationalism in a world economy like ours is not a sustainable decision: 
monetary problems do not allow purely national solutions”63. It was crucial, 
however,  to keep the domestic price dynamics under control, in order to 
avoid significant increases that would have twarted the positive effects of 
the devaluation on the trade balance and would have resulted in adverse 




                                                                                                                                                                          
rail transport tariffs and currency policy (Cf. Flora, 1896; 1907; 1909; 1930). He was 
member of the Royal Academy of Science of Bologna and of the “Accademia dei Lincei” of 
Rome and took part as a delegate of the Italian government in the Dawes committee. Flora 
was also an active commentator of economic facts and policies on national based 
newspapers. Cf. Colonna, 1987.  
62 A.P. Senate, 17th May 1935, 1193-1200. 
63 A.P. Senate, 22th Dec. 1936, 2555. 
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6.  Concluding remarks  
 
It is now possible to take up the main issues that emerged in this paper 
with the aim of outlining some interpretative lines. A first important point to 
bear in mind, particularly for the purpose of a comparison with the work 
done by the economists in the Italian Parliament during the ‘liberal age’, is 
that the fascist regime enacted a deep shift in the balance of power between 
the legislative and the executive. The Chamber of deputies, in particular, lost 
the centrality and the representativeness it had during the ‘liberal age’: after 
1929, when a new electoral law was enforced,  its members were selected 
directly by the ‘Grand council of fascism’ from a list of candidates chosen by 
the corporative confederations, a few national associations and academic 
institutions. The evolution of the Senate was different: from the 1930s, 
however, also this institution became increasingly ‘fascistized’.  
From the end of the 1920’s, therefore, no anti-fascist opposition was 
tolerated in Parliament. This does not mean, however, that this institution 
became simply a ‘rubber stamp’ for the bills drafted by the government. An 
interesting aspect which stems from a systematic analysis of the 
parliamentary proceedings, is that the debate on the floor still reflected 
different positions within the fascist regime, connected mainly to different 
interest groups (the representatives of the employers’ organizations and of 
the fascist trade unions, the landowners, the representatives of the 
professional associations).  
The internal structure of the executive power also changed 
substantially: a dominant role was assumed by Mussolini who enforced his 
personal dictatorship and entrusted the ministries on economic and 
financial issues mainly to experts, whose role was to implement policy 
decisions ultimately taken by the duce himself. 
In this context, it is hardly surprising that the vast majority of the 
economists who acted as legislators and policymakers during Mussolini’s 
regime supported more or less wholeheartedly the fascist ideology. At the 
Chamber of deputies the only exception was constituted by three professors 
of economics elected in 1924 among the ranks of the opposition (Angelo 
Mauri, Arturo Labriola and Antonio Graziadei). In October 1926, however, 
all members of the opposition were expelled by the Chamber and their voice 
was silenced. In the Senate a dissenting position was held by Luigi Einaudi, 
an outstanding representative of the economic and political liberalism and 
by Achille Loria, an eclectic thinker influenced by the German  historical 
school and to some extent, by marxism. Whilst Einaudi manifested his 
dissent by avoiding taking part to the debates on the floor, Loria held a few 
authoritative speeches to discuss from a purely ‘technical’ point of view key 
initiatives taken by the government . 
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Another point highlightened by this research is that most of the 
economists in Parliament or at the government during these years were 
professors in applied economics. In particular, it is worth to underline the 
presence of a substantial group of agricultural economists: six in total, three 
of whom, respectively Arrigo Serpieri, Giacomo Acerbo and Giuseppe 
Tassinari became ministries or undersecretary of agriculture and, at the 
same time, were members of the Chamber of deputies; two, Vincenzo 
Ricchioni and Zeno Vignati were only members of this Chamber; one, Pietro 
Sitta, was a senator. This confirms the crucial role attributed to agriculture 
by the regime, at an economic and, perhaps even more,  political and social 
level.  
A key role was also played by scholars in public economics and finance: 
in primis Alberto De’ Stefani, minister of finance in the years 1922-25; but 
also Gaetano Zingali and Attilio da Empoli, members of the Chamber of 
deputies, and Federico Flora, member of the Senate. The role of the theorists 
of corporatism was significant but circumscribed: this paper analyses the 
activity of Agostino Lanzillo and Gino Arias. 
There is another aspect that, in our view, can be drawn from this 
research and allows us to provide new insight not only on the role of the 
economists in these years but also on the intrinsic shortcomings of 
Mussolini’s dictatorship. As mentioned before, several of the economists 
who played a key role in building the fascist State were among the most 
valuable experts in their respective fields, beside being strongly committed 
to fascist and corporatist ideology. Mussolini, however, did not hesitate to 
put them aside whenever his strategic priorities changed or fundamental 
political issues emerged. This was the case of De’ Stefani, whose measures 
against stock market speculation made him unpopular among influential 
financial circles and whose orthodox customs policy was hardly compatible 
with Mussolini’s aim of stabilizing the lira at an high exchange rate; it is also 
the case of Serpieri, whose policy of “bonifica integrale” risked to alienate 
many landowners from the regime and, anyway, absorbed substantial public 
resources which Mussolini needed for his new priority, the Ethiopian war. 
All of this pales in the face of the tragedy of the racist laws, strongly 
supported by Mussoliny and approved in October 1938; laws that destroyed 
the careers and put at risk the lives of so many intellectuals of Jewish 
descent, no matter if they had been alien to fascism (this was the case of 
Achille Loria) or, as in the case of Gino Arias, had actively contributed in the 
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